Abstract. The dynamics of belief and knowledge is one of the major components of any autonomous system that should be able to incorporate new pieces of information. We introduced the Horn knowledge base dynamics to deal with two important points: first, to handle belief states that need not be deductively closed; and the second point is the ability to declare certain parts of the belief as immutable. In this paper, we address another, radically new approach to this problem. This approach is very close to the Hansson's dyadic representation of belief. Here, we consider the immutable part as defining a new logical system. By a logical system, we mean that it defines its own consequence relation and closure operator. Based on this, we provide an abductive framework for Horn knowledge base dynamics.
Introduction
Over the last three decades [15] , abduction has been embraced in AI as a nonmonotonic reasoning paradigm to address some of the limitations of deductive reasoning in classical logic. The role of abduction has been demonstrated in a variety of applications. It has been proposed as a reasoning paradigm in AI for diagnosis, natural language understanding, default reasoning, planning, knowledge assimilation and belief revision, multi-agent systems and other problems (see [47] ).
In the concept of knowledge assimilation and belief revision (see [38] ), when a new item of information is added to a knowledge base, inconsistency can result. Revision means modifying the Horn knowledge base in order to maintain consistency, while keeping the new information and removing (contraction) or not removing the least possible previous information. In our case, update means revision and contraction, that is insertion and deletion in database perspective. Our previous work [10, 11] makes connections with contraction from Horn knowledge base dynamics.
Our Horn knowledge base dynamics is defined in two parts: an immutable part (formulae or sentences) and updatable part (literals) (for definition and properties see works of Nebel [35] and Segerberg [48] ). Horn knowledge bases have a set of integrity constraints (see the definitions in later section). In the case of finite Horn knowledge bases, it is sometimes hard to see how the update relations should be modified to accomplish certain knowledge base updates.
Example 1. Consider a database with an (immutable) rule that a staff member is a person who is currently working in a research group under a chair. Additional (updatable) facts are that matthias and gerhard are group chairs, and delhibabu and aravindan are staff members in group info1. Our first integrity constraint (IC) is that each research group has only one chair ie. ∀x, y, z (y=z) ← group chair(x,y) ∧ group chair(x,z). Second integrity constraint is that a person can be a chair for only one research group ie. ∀x, y, z (y=z)← group chair(y,x) ∧ group chair(z,x).
Immutable part: staff chair(X,Y)← staff group(X,Z),group chair(Z,Y).
Updatable part: group chair(infor1,matthias)← group chair(infor2,gerhard)← staff group(delhibabu,infor1)← staff group(aravindan,infor1)← Suppose we want to update this database with the information, staff chair(delhibabu,aravindan), that is staff chair(delhibabu,aravindan)← staff group(delhibabu,Z) group chair(Z,aravindan)
If we are restricted to definite clauses, there is only one plausible way to do this: delhibabu and aravindan belong to groups infor1, this updating means that we need to delete (remove) matthias from the database and newly add (insert) aravindan to the database (aravindan got promoted to the chair of the research group infor1 and he was removed from research group infor1). This results in an update that is too strong. If we allow disjunctive information into the database, however, we can accomplish the update by minimal adding wrt consistency staff group(delhibabu,infor1) ∨ group chair(infor1,aravindan)
and this option appears intuitively to be correct.
When adding new beliefs to the Horn knowledge base, if the new belief is violating integrity constraints then belief revision needs to be performed, otherwise, it is simply added. As we will see, in these cases abduction can be used in order to compute all the possibilities and it is not up to user or system to choose among them.
When dealing with the revision of a Horn knowledge base (both insertions and deletions), there are other ways to change a Horn knowledge base and it has to be performed automatically also. Considering the information, change is precious and must be preserved as much as possible. The principle of minimal change [21, 46] can provide a reasonable strategy. On the other hand, practical implementations have to handle contradictory, uncertain, or imprecise information, so several problems can arise: how to define efficient change in the style of AGM [1] ; what result has to be chosen [25, 29, 33] ; and finally, according to a practical point of view, what computational model to support for Horn knowledge base revision has to be provided?
Since Horn knowledge base change is one of the main problems arising in knowledge representation, it has been tackled according to several points of view. In this article, we consider the immutable part as defining a new logical system. By a logical system, we mean that it defines its own consequence relation and closure operator. Based on this, we provide an abductive framework for belief dynamics (see [3, 8, 50] ).
The rest of paper is organized as follows: First we start with preliminaries along with the concept of logical system and properties of consequences operator. In Section 3, we introduce Horn knowledge base dynamics with our logical system. In Section 4, we explore the relationship of Horn knowledge base dynamics with coherence approach. In Section 5, we present how Horn knowledge base dynamics can be realized using abductive explanations. In Section 6, we give brief overview of related works. In Section 7, we make conclusions with a summary of our contribution as well as a discussion of future directions of investigation. with a non-empty body are known as a type of integrity constraints (ICs), specifically denials, and they are normally used to prune out unwanted candidate solutions. We abuse the not default negation notation applying it to non-empty sets of literals too: we write not S to denote {not s : s ∈ S}, and confound not not a ≡ a. When S is an arbitrary, non-empty set of literals
As expected, we say a set of literals S is consistent iff S + ∩ |S − | = ∅. We also write heads(P ) to denote the set of heads of non-IC rules of a (possibly constrained) program P , i.e., heads(P ) = {head(r) : r ∈ P }\{⊥}, and f acts(P ) to denote the set of facts of P -f acts(P ) = {head(r) : r ∈ P ∧ body(r) = ∅}. Unlike Horn knowledge base dynamics, where knowledge is defined as a set of sentences, here we wish to define a Horn knowledge base KB wrt a language L, as an abductive framework < P, Ab, IC, K >, where, * P is an acyclic normal logic program with all abducibles in P at level 0 and no non-abducible at level 0. P is referred to as a logical system. This in conjunction with the integrity constraints corresponds to immutable part of the Horn knowledge base, here P is defined by immutable part. This is discussed further in the next subsection;
Definition 2 (Level mapping[4]). Let P be a normal logic program and
* Ab is a set of atoms from L, called the abducibles. This notion is required in an abductive framework, and this corresponds to the atoms that may appear in the updatable part of the knowledge; * IC is the set of integrity constraints, a set of sentences from language L.
This specifies the integrity of a Horn knowledge base and forms a part of the knowledge that can not be modified over time; * K is a set of sentences from L. It is the current knowledge, and the only part of KB that changes over time. This corresponds to the updatable part of the Horn knowledge base. The main requirement here is that no sentence in K can have an atom that does not appear in Ab.
Logical system
The main idea of our approach is to consider the immutable part of the knowledge to define a new logical system. By a logical system, we mean that P defines its own consequence relation |= P and its closure Cn p . Given P , we have the Herbrand Base HB P and G P , the ground instantiation of P . An abductive interpretation I is a set of abducibles, i.e. I ⊆ Ab. How I interprets all the ground atoms of L 1 is defined, inductively on the level of atoms wrt P , as follows: * An atom A at level 0 (note that only abducibles are at level 0) is interpreted as: A is true in I iff A ∈ I, else it is false in I.
This interpretation of ground atoms can be extended, in the usual way, to interpret sentences in L, as follows (where α and β are sentences):
* ¬α is true in I iff α is false in I. * α ∧ β is true in I iff both α and β are true in I. * α ∨ β is true in I iff either α is true in I or β is true in I. * ∀α is true in I iff all ground instantiations of α are true in I. * ∃α is true in I iff some ground instantiation of α is true in I.
Given a sentence α in L, an abductive interpretation I is said to be an abductive model of α iff α is true in I. Extending this to a set of sentences K, I is a abductive model of K iff I is an abductive model of every sentence α in K.
Given a set of sentences K and a sentence α, α is said to be a P -consequence of K, written as K |= P α, iff every abductive model of K is an abductive model of α also. Putting it in other words, let M od(K) be the set of all abductive models of K. Then α is a P -consequence of K iff α is true in all abductive interpretations in M od(K). The consequence operator Cn P is then defined as Cn
K is said to be P-consistent iff there is no expression α s.t. α ∈ Cn P (K) and ¬α ∈ Cn P (K). Two sentences α and β are said to be P -equivalent to each other, written as α ≡ β, iff they have the same set of abductive models , i.e. M od(α) = M od(β).
Properties of consequences operator
Since a new consequence operator is defined, it is reasonable, to ask whether it satisfies certain properties that are required in the Horn knowledge base dynamics context. Here, we observe that all the required properties, listed by various researchers in Horn knowledge base dynamics, are satisfied by the defined consequence operator. The following propositions follow from the above definitions, and can be verified easily.
Anther interesting property is monotony,
Cn P satisfies superclassicality , i.e. if α can be derived from K by first order classical logic, then α ∈ Cn P (K).
Statics of a Horn knowledge base
The statics of a Horn knowledge base KB, is given by the current knowledge K and the integrity constraints IC. An abductive interpretation M is an abductive model of KB iff it is an abductive model of K ∪ IC. Let M od(KB) be the set of all abductive models of KB. The belief set represented by KB, written as KB
• is given as,
e. α is false in every model of KB). Note that there may exist a sentence α s.t. α is neither accepted nor rejected in KB (i.e. α is true in some but not all models of KB), and so KB represents a partial description of the world.
Two Horn knowledge bases KB 1 and KB 2 are said to be equivalent to each other, written as KB 1 ≡ KB 2 , iff they are based on the same logical system and their current knowledge are P -equivalent, i.e. P 1 = P 2 , Ab 1 = Ab 2 , IC 1 = IC 2 and K 1 ≡ K 2 . Obviously, two equivalent Horn knowledge bases KB 1 and KB 2 represent the same belief set, i.e. KB 
Horn knowledge base dynamics
In AGM [1] three kinds of belief dynamics are defined: expansion, contraction and revision. We consider all of them, one by one, in the sequel.
Expansion
Let α be new information that has to be added to a knowledge base KB. Suppose ¬α is not accepted in KB. Then, obviously α is P -consistent with IC, and KB can be expanded by α, by modifying K as follows:
Note that we do not force the presence of α in the new K, but only say that α must be in the belief set represented by the expanded Horn knowledge base. If in case ¬α is accepted in KB (in other words, α is inconsistent with IC), then expansion of KB by α results in a inconsistent Horn knowledge base with no abductive models, i.e. (KB + α)
• is the set of all sentences in L. Putting it in model-theoretic terms, KB can be expanded by a sentence α, when α is not false in all models of KB. The expansion is defined as:
If α is false in all models of KB, then clearly M od(KB+α) is empty, implying that expanded Horn knowledge base is inconsistent.
Revision
As usual, for revising and contracting a Horn knowledge base, the rationality of the change is discussed first. Later a construction is provided that complies with the proposed rationality postulates.
Rationality postulates
Let KB =< P, Ab, IC, K > be revised by a sentence α to result in a new Horn knowledge base
When a Horn knowledge base is revised, we do not (generally) wish to modify the underlying logical system P or the set of abducibles Ab. This is refereed to as inferential constancy by Hansson [19, 20] .
Construction
Let S stand for the set of all abductive interpretations that are consistent with IC, i.e. S = M od(IC). We do not consider abductive interpretations that are not models of IC, simply because IC does not change during revision. Observe that when IC is empty, S is the set of all abductive interpretations. Given a Horn knowledge base KB, and two abductive interpretations I 1 and I 2 from S, we can compare how close these interpretations are to KB by using an order ≤ KB among abductive interpretations in S.
For any Horn knowledge base KB, the following are desired properties of ≤ KB : (≤ 1) (Pre-order)≤ KB is a pre-order , i.e. it is transitive and reflexive.
Let KB (and consequently K) be revised by a sentence α, and ≤ KB be a rational order that satisfies (≤ 1) to (≤ 5). Then the abductive models of the revised Horn knowledge base are given precisely by: M in(M od({α}∪IC), ≤ KB ). Note that, this construction does not say what the resulting K is, but merely says what should be the abductive models of the new Horn knowledge base.
Representation theorem
Now, we proceed to show that revision of KB by α, as constructed above, satisfies all the rationality postulates stipulated in the beginning of this section. This is formalized by the following lemma. Proof. 
is a model of both α and β, and M is selected by
But, that is not all. Any rational revision of KB by α, that satisfies all the rationality postulates, can be constructed by our construction method, and this is formalized below. 
Proof. Let us construct an order ≤ KB among interpretations in S as follows: For any two abductive interpretations I and I ′ in S, define I ≤ KB I ′ iff either I ∈ M od(KB) or I ∈ M od(KB ∔ f orm(I, I
′ )), where f orm(I, I ′ ) stands for sentence whose only models are I and I ′ . We will show that ≤ KB thus constructed
First, we show that M in(M od({α} ∪ IC), ≤ KB ) = M od(KB ∔ α).Suppose α is not satisfiable, i.e. M od(α) is empty, or α does not satisfy IC, then there are no abductive models of {α} ∪ IC, and hence M in(M od({α} ∪ IC), ≤ KB ) is empty. From (∔3), we infer that M od(KB ∔ α) is also empty. When α is satisfiable and α satisfies IC, the required result is obtained in two parts:
Since 
(because I ∈ M in(M od({α} ∪ IC), ≤ KB )). Suppose I ∈ M od(KB), then (∔4) immediately gives I ∈ M od(KB ∔ α). If not, from our definition of ≤ KB , it is clear that I ∈ M od(KB∔f orm(I, I ′ )). Note that α∧f orm(I, I ′ ) ≡ f orm(I, I
′ ), since both I and I ′ are models of α. From (∔6) and (∔7), we get M od(KB ∔ α) ∩ {I,
From (∔1) we get I is a model of IC, and from (∔2), we obtain I ∈ M od(α). 
Now we proceed to show that the order ≤ KB among S, constructed as per our definition, satisfies all the rationality axioms (≤ 1) to (≤ 5). (≤ 1) ≤ KB is a pre-order. Note that we need to consider only abductive interpretations from S. From (∔2) and (∔3), we have M od(KB ∔ f orm(I, I
′ )) = {I}, and so I ≤ KB I. Thus ≤ KB satisfies reflexivity. let I 1 ∈ M od(IC) and I 2 
M od(IC).

Clearly, it is possible that two interpretations
(≤ 5) If KB ≡ KB ′ , then ≤ KB =≤ KB ′ .
This follows immediately from the fact that ∔ satisfies (∔5).
Thus, the order among interpretations ≤ KB , constructed as per our definition, satisfies (≤ 1) to (≤ 5), and
So, we have a one to one correspondence between the axiomatization and the construction, which is highly desirable, and this is summarized by the following representation theorem.
Theorem 1. Let KB be revised by α, and KB ∔ α be obtained by the construction discussed above. Then, ∔ is a revision operator iff it satisfies all the rationality postulates (∔1) to (∔7).
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1. and Lemma 2.
Contraction
Contraction of a sentence from a Horn knowledge base KB is studied in the same way as that of revision. We first discuss the rationality of change during contraction and proceed to provide a construction for contraction using duality between revision and contraction.
Rationality Postulates
Let KB =< P, Ab, IC, K > be contracted by a sentence α to result in a new Horn knowledge base KB−α =< P ′ , Ab 
Before providing a construction for contraction, we wish to study the duality between revision and contraction. The Levi and Harper identities still holds in our case, and is discussed in the sequel.
Relationship between contraction and revision
Contraction and revision are related to each other. Given a contraction function−, a revision function ∔ can be obtained as follows:
The following theorem formally states that Levi identity holds in our approach.
Theorem 2. Let− be a contraction operator that satisfies all the rationality postulates (−1) to (−8).
Then, the revision function ∔, obtained from− using the Levi Identity, satisfies all the rationality postulates (∔1) to (∔7). .
Similarly, a contraction function− can be constructed using the given revision function ∔ as follows:
Theorem 3. Let ∔ be a revision operator that satisfies all the rationality postulates (∔1) to (∔7). Then, the contraction function−, obtained from ∔ using the Harper Identity, satisfies all the rationality postulates (−1) to (−8).
Construction
Given the construction for revision, based on order among interpretation in S, a construction for contraction can be provided as:
where ≤ KB is the relation among interpretations in S that satisfies the rationality axioms (≤ 1) to (≤ 5). As in the case of revision, this construction says what should be the models of the resulting Horn knowledge base, and does not explicitly say what the resulting Horn knowledge base is.
Representation theorem
Since the construction for contraction is based on a rational contraction for revision, the following lemmae and theorem follow obviously. 
Proof. Follows from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
Relationship with the coherence approach of AGM
Given Horn knowledge base KB =< P, Ab, IC, K > represents a belief set KB
• that is closed under Cn P . We have defined how KB can be expanded, revised, or contracted. The question now is: does our foundational approach (wrt classical first-order logic) on KB coincide with coherence approach (wrt our consequence operator Cn P ) of AGM on KB
• ? There is a problem in answering this question (similar practical problem [5] ) , since our approach, we require IC to be immutable, and only the current knowledge K is allowed to change. On the contrary, AGM approach treat every sentence in KB
• equally, and can throw out sentences from Cn P (IC). One way to solve this problem is to assume that sentences in Cn P (IC) are more entrenched than others. However, one-to-one correspondence can be established, when IC is empty. The key is our consequence operator Cn P , and in the following, we show that coherence approach of AGM with this consequence operator, is exactly same as our foundational approach, when IC is empty.
Expansion
Expansion in AGM (see [1] )-framework is defined as KB#α = Cn P (KB • ∪ {α}), is is easy to see that this is equivalent to our definition of expansion (when IC is empty), and is formalized below.
it must be a model of ∆ 1 Thus, we have a way to generate all the models of {α} ∪IC, and we just need to select a subset of this based on an order that satisfies (≤ 1) to (≤ 5). Suppose we have such an order that satisfies all the required postulates, then this order can be mapped to a particular set of abductive explanations for α wrt KB. This is stated precisely in the following theorem. An important implication of this theorem is that there is no need to compute all the abductive explanations for α wrt KB. However, it does not say which abductive explanations need to be computed. The above theorem 10. is still not very useful in realizing revision. We need to have an order among all the interpretations that satisfies all the required axioms, and need to compute all the abductive explanations for α wrt KB. The need to compute all abductive explanations arises from the fact that the converse of the above theorem does not hold in general. This scheme requires an universal order ≤, in the sense that same order can be used for any Horn knowledge base. Otherwise, it would be necessary to specify the new order to be used for further modifying (KB ∔ α). However, even if the order can be worked out, it is not desirable to demand all abductive explanations of α wrt KB be computed. So, it is desirable to work out, when the converse of the above theorem is true. The following theorem says that, suppose α is rejected in KB, then revision of KB by α can be worked out in terms of some abductive explanations for α wrt KB. 
The precondition that α is rejected in KB is not a serious limitation in various applications such as database updates and diagnosis, where close world assumption is employed to infer negative information. For example, in diagnosis it is generally assumed that all components are functioning normally, unless otherwise there is specific information against it. Hence, a Horn knowledge base in diagnosis either accepts or rejects normality of a component, and there is no "don't know" third state. In other words, in these applications the Horn knowledge base is assumed to be complete. Hence, when such a complete Horn knowledge base is revised by α, either α is already accepted in KB or rejected in KB, and so the above scheme works fine.
Related Works
We begin by recalling previous work on view deletion. Chandrabose [10, 11] , defines a contraction operator in view deletion with respect to a set of formulae or sentences using Hansson's [20] belief change. Similar to our [14] approach, he focused on set of formulae or sentences in Horn knowledge base revision for view update wrt. insertion and deletion and formulae are considered at the same level. Chandrabose proposed different ways to change Horn knowledge base via only database deletion, devising particular postulate which is shown to be necessary and sufficient for such an update process.
Our Horn knowledge base consists of two parts, immutable part and updatable part , but focus is on principle of minimal change. There are more related works on that topic. Eiter [17] is focusing on revision from different perspective -prime implication. Segerberg [48] defined new modeling for belief revision in terms of irrevocability on prioritized revision. Hansson [20] constructed five types of non-prioritized belief revision. Makinson [31] developed dialogue form of revision AGM. Papini [39] defined a new version of Horn knowledge base revision.
We are bridging gap between philosophical work, paying little attention to computational aspects of database work [32, 49] . In such a case, Hansson's [20] kernel change is related with abductive method. Aliseda's [2] book on abductive reasoning is one of the motivation keys. Christiansen's [12, 13] work on dynamics of abductive logic grammars exactly fits our minimal change (insertion and deletion).
In general, our abduction theory is related to Horn knowledge base dynamics (see how abduction theory is related with other applications, respectively, reasoning [6, 41, 42] , update [44, 45] , equivalence [22, 42, 43] and problem solving [23, 30] ). More similar to our work is paper presented by Bessant et al. [7] , local searchbased heuristic technique that empirically proves to be often viable, even in the context of very large propositional applications. Laurent et al. [26] parented updating deductive databases in which every insertion or deletion of a fact can be performed in a deterministic way.
Furthermore, and at a first sight more related to our work, some work has been done on "core-retainment" (same as our immutable part) in the model of language splitting introduced by Parikh [37] . More recently, Doukari [16] ,Özçep [36] and Wu, et al. [51] applied similar ideas for dealing with knowledge base dynamics. These works represent motivation keys for our future work. Second, we are dealing with how to change minimally in the theory of "principle of minimal change", but current focuss is on finding second best abductive explanation [27] and 2-valued minimal hypothesis for each normal program [40] . Finally, when we presented Horn knowledge base change in abduction framework, we did not talk about compilability and complexity (see the works of Liberatore [28] and Zanuttini [52] ).
Conclusion
The main contribution of this work lies in showing how abductive framework deals with Horn knowledge base dynamics via belief change operation. We consider the immutable part as defining a new logical system. By a logical system, we mean that it defines its own consequence relation and closure operator. We presented that relationship of the coherence approach of AGM with this consequence operator is exactly same as our foundational approach, when IC is empty.
We believe that Horn knowledge base dynamics can also be applied to other applications such as view maintenance, diagnosis, and we plan to explore it in further works [9] . Still, a lot of developments are possible, for improving existing operators or for defining new classes of change operators. As immediate extension, question raises: is there any real life application for AGM in 25 year theory? [18] . The revision and update are more challenging in Horn knowledge base dynamic, so we can extend the theory to combine results similar to Konieczny's [24] and Nayak's [34] .
